Economic models assume that competition will encourage information transparency which is essential for efficient decision making and functioning of markets. However, information can be manipulated or concealed to change the receiver's beliefs. This research project will use laboratory experiments to test whether competition among economic agents encourage transparency. In these experiments, agents send information to persuade or influence a decision maker. The study proceeds in two steps. In the first experiment, only one person at a time, without competition, sends information to the decision maker. In the second experiment, two competing people send information to the decision maker. There is no prediction of full information revelation in the first experiment, while theory predicts full information revelation in the second. These design differences allows the researchers to test whether competition leads to information transparency. The results of this research project will provide a test of one of the fundamental assumptions about competition which is the foundation of most market economies. The results will also provide guidance on designing mechanisms to elicit transparency in economic interactions, thus improve the efficiency of the US economy, growth, and income. This proposed research will build on Bayesian persuasion and use laboratory experiments to test whether competition leads to transparency in information transmission. Conventional wisdom suggests that competition between agents will encourage transparency. The PIs will test this in a lab experiment in which two agents individually provide information in different ways, to influence a decision maker. The PIs develop a model in which the two senders of information have zero sum utilities and expect the first sender to reveal the truth. If s/he conceals the truth, competitive theory predicts that the second agent will send the opposite signal and the receiver is likely to follow the more precise information. The base model is one in which only one agent at a time sends information to the decision maker. The experiments will test these theoretical predictions and will serve to validate the theory as well as provide guidance on behavioral factors that affect transparency. Besides testing the theoretical assumption of information transparency, this research will provide guidance on mechanism design to enhance information transparency. This will help improve the functioning of the US economy, hence economic growth and increased income. This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.